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Introduction

Following World '!-lar II, the United States Merchant marine possessed unchallenged hegemony at sea, but this wa r-d.nduc ed phenomenon was short lived.
The U. S. merchant marine, today, is struggling to attain physical and economic health. but it is a formidable undertaking since approximately 95 percent of U. S. ocean-borne trade is currently being carried by foreign flag
vessels.
The diminution of the American maritime posture is a perplexing matter
since it can be regarded, intuitively, as both unnatural and untimely.

The

U. S. has a heritage of the sea that predates the founding of the Republic.
The oceans, and the ships that sail them, have been a prominent factor in
shaping virtually every crucial moment in our Nation's history.
Recent Presidentially-appointed national committees and commissions con~erned

with development of a national ocean program have been cognizant of

~his inextricable link.
~ciously
~ystem.

Yet, in the course of their deliberations they con-

chose to exclude serious discussion of the marine transportation

1

1" • • • the problems of the U. S. merchant marine • • • are extremely
complex and deserve more careful, concentrated thought than the
panel was able to contribute in light of the broad scope of the
~larine Resources and Engineering Development Act."
[U. S.,
Commission on Harine Science, Engineering and Resources. Industr~
and Technology, Panel Report, vo l , 2 (IJashington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office. January 1969). p. 45.]
"Of all the fundamental and pressing issues whfch HACOA wanted to

include in this Report, but did not. ~larine Transportation stands
out. However • • • it was next to impossible to examine the issues
and choices from an adequate perspective in the absence of a detailed analysis of the maritime transportation system as it interrelates with problems of economic growth, social costs and benefits,
and environmental goals." [U.S •• National Advisory Committee on
Or .... "'" .,.",,1

"

~Washington~

(Foreword). J

•

D.C.:

A

R~~--"

f-n

.. l:~ n_~_~A~~ ..

~~.1

Government Printing Office. June

"h~

r

1~72),

.

_

pp. v-vi
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At this point. an interpretation of
warranted.

~lrine

transportation system is

The Herchant 11arine Act of 1936 (as amended). through the use

of its regulatory and promotional powers. remains the principal mechanism
for maritime policy.

Designed to "further the development. and maintenance

of an adequate and well-balanced American merchant marine. to promote the
commerce of the United States. to aid in the national defense." the Act
called for a strong merchant marine that woul d be:
sufficient to carry its domestic water-borne commerce
and a substantial portion of the water-borne export
and import foreign commerce of the United States • • •
capable of serving as a naval and military auxiliary
in time of war or national emergency.
owned and operated under the United States flag by
citizens of the United States insofar as may be
practicaL
composed of the best-equipped. safest. and most
suitable types of vessels. constructed in the
United States and manned with a trained and efficient citizen personnel.
supplemented by efficient facilities for shipbuilding
and ship repair • • • 1
As used in this paper. the marine transportation system will focus
upon the "well-balanced" aspects of maritime activities.

Emphasis '''ill

be placed on the carriage of uater-borne conunerce and related supportive
activities and industries.

Although the ability of the merchant marine to

function as a naval and military auxiliary will not be specifically examined in this paper. a related aspect will be reviewed concerning the
foreign-flag vessels under so-called "Effective U. S. Control (EUSC)."
lSee Charles D. Baker. "Water Transportation and National Policy -A Study in Success and Failure." Proceedings of the I1arine TechnoloS,l,
Society (September 1973). pp. 579-585.

3

Hany factors have deterred national ocean-policy commlttees from
examining the issues associated with the U. S. marine transportation
system.

The rationale for omission includes the embedment of the trans-

portation system in a complex and established legislative and bureaucratic framework; the extensive interaction of this industry with complex
international, political, economic and legal issues; and the enormity of
the developmental, investment, labor and international competitive problems which beset the industry.
This paper, with only the broadest of perspectives, attempts to make
some general comments concerning the economies of the marine transportation system and the interrelationships between marine transportation modes
and related industry.

The Multiplier Effect of Marine Transportation
and Related Industry
In developing this examination, it is intended to proceed on the
assumption that a marine transportation system and its related industry
have a multiplier effect on the national economy which might be a major
factor in determining the relative rate of increase of gross national
product among the nations of the world and, ultimately, be a major factor
in determining the relative national standings in per capita income.
To illustrate this supposition, it has been

esti~ated

that in the

ten-year period from 1958 to 1967, the beleaguered U. S. merchant marine
contributed $11.3 billion in quantifiable benefits to the nation at a
1
cost of $2.7 billion.
This represents a net benefit of $8.6 billion,
or over $4 in benefit for each dollar of cost.
A supportive espousal also is offered by officials of the Maritime
Administration wherein they estimate that if all energy fuels and materials
needed by 1985 were to be imported on U. S. flag vessels, the subsidy cost
($8.1 billion) to the U. S. taxpayers of a shipbuilding/operating program
sufficient to carry these essential materials would generate the follo\ving
returns:

Ijames R. Barker and Robert Brundwe Ln, The United States ;·ferchant
Harine in National Perspective (Lexington, lIass.: Heath Lexington
Books, 1970).
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2.1 million raan-years of employment wouLd be
generated to build and operate the vessels

$20.3 blll1c. •. in wUb-<'> vou l.d be paid to shIpyard and shipboard employees
$11.3 billion woul<1 be paid in income taxes

A $57 billion expansion in gross national
product (GNP) would be generated
$9.3 billion in balance-of-payments gain
would result.l
If this hypothesis is even partially correct, then there is cause

for grave national concern, for by any objective analysis, our progress
in the development of a marine transportation system is lagging behind
that of many other nations.

This concern also must be extended to those

activities which are directly associated with marine transportation
the development of deep water ports and offshore oil terminals, the
establishment of integrated through services for unitized cargos, the
construction and repair of very-large and ultra-large tankers and
nuclear-powered merchant ships, the development of offshore commercial
and industrial facilities, the development of marine-based rapid transit
systems for the movement of goods and people, and the utility of Effective
U. S. Control (EUSC) ships in time of war or national emergency.

1

J. Kasputys and J. B. Young, "Subsidies, Seed ~·10ney, and
National Security," Sea Pm-ler (Washington. D. C.: Navy League
of the United States. September 1973). pp. 23-30. (Hereafter
referred to as Subsidies -- Sea Power.)

Review of Specific Areas of Concern
The aforementioned generalizations are made evident by a review
of specific areas of concern for a marine transportation system:
Transport of Oil
Unitized Cargos
Specialty Carriers and Offshore Platforms
Marine-Based Transit Systems
Shipbuilding and Ship Repair
Effective U. S. Control (EDSC) Ships

6

Transport of Oil
On a worldwide bn s Ls the trend in oil transportation has been t owar d
the use of ships of increasing size and draft.

1

Figure (1) clearly de-

rnonstrates the economy of scale associated "lith supertankers.

The trend

to size must, however, be accompanied by deepwater port capabilities, and,
because no existing U. S. port has the requisite draft accommodations, the
supertanker has to date bypassed the United States.

In advocating the

development of deepwater ports, President Nixon stated the following in
his Energy

~Iessage

If

W~

of 1973:
do not enlarge our deepwater port capacity,

i t is clear that both American and foreign companies

will expand oil transshipment terminals in the Bahamas
and the Canadian Maritime Provinces. From these terminals, oil \·;111 be brought to our co nvent LonaL ports
by growing numbers of sm~ll and medium size transshipment vessels, therehy increasing the risks of
pollution from shipping operations and accidents.
At the same time, the United States will lose the
jobs and capital that those foreign facilities provide.
Given these considerations, I believe we must
move f orwa r d \"ith an ambitious program to create
new deepvater ports for receivinr, petroleum imports. 2

IU.S., Department of Commerca, iIaritime Administration,
The Economics of Deep\"ater Terminals O.,rashington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 5-8.
2president's Energy Hessage of April 18, 1973 to the
Congress of the United States.
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In hi6 Energy Nessage of 1974, the Arab oil embargo notwithstanding,
President Nixon, again, made a strong appeal for appropriate legislation
to "permit the development of neH deepHater port facilities offshore."
He explained:
Even though our policy is to achieve selfsufficiency, we will clearly continue to import
oil as long as it is availaLle at reasonable
prices. To enaLle us to import fuel more economically, I have proposed Federal Government
licensing of the construction and operation of
deepwater port facilities three miles or more
at sea on the Outer Continental Shelf. The
main use of these facilities wouLd he to inport
crude oil in ships that nrc economically and
environmentally desirable, but are too deep of
draft to permit their entry into our port facilities on the East and Gulf Coasts.
This legislation would also eliminate many
of the legal uncertainties whf.ch nOH drive private investors away from l.nerican waters and to
other nations of the Hestern Hemisphere. The
present system only serves to create investments
and jobs abroad and raises our costs of imported
oil, already high, even further • • • (the Arab
oil embargo) has opened our eyes to the shortsighted policy (of excessive dependency on
foreign supplies of a vital good) 'ole had been
pursuing. l
Total tanker arrivals for the 48 contiguous states in 1971 numbered

67,700 \-lith 84 percent of these along the Eastern Seaboard.

Hest Coast

arrivals amounted to 6.5 percent, and Gulf Coast arrivals were 9.5 percent
of the total.

2

The cost of transporting oil to the U. S. East Coast is

shown in Table (1).

At the present time (prior to the AraL oil embargo)

1

President's Energy ~[essage of January 23, 1974 to the
Congress of the United States.
2

Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Environmental Reporter
(Hashington, D. C.: Bureau of r.ational Affairs, Iric , , }!ay 1973),
p. 19.

I

I
1

I!

TABLE 1
COST OF OIL PER TON DELIVERED TO THE EAST COAST FROH OCEANIC SERVICES
(Foreign Flag Ships)

Existing
Situation
Cost of Ocean Freight
Transfer Charges
Transport to Refinery

Canadian Offshore Terminal

Off shore Island
and Pipeline

Offshore Island and
Feeder Vessels

5.30

5.30

5.30

.35

.65

.80

1.13

.40

.38

I--'

0

Cost of Unloading

.15

.15

.15

Cost of Pollution Control

.15

.15

.15

7.08

6.65

6.78

I

Cost Oil Per Ton

10.85

(326,000 ton ship)

(326,000 ton ship)

,

(250.000 ton ship)

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Haritime Administration, Office of Research
and Development, Offshore Terrnin~l Development Project, September 1971.

:

I

I
I

I
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more than 104.000.000 tons of oil per year are transported by ship to the
East Coast.

1

Considering the differentials indicated in Table (1). an

annual cost savings of

approx~mately

$425 million per year could be real-

ized through the implementation of a super carrier/offshore terminal
system.

Such a differential would war rant; a multi-billion dollar invest-

ment at current expectations for return on capital and. indeed. this is
supported by the number of offshore terminal studies now being conducted
by private and local interests.

2

Significantly, the legislation submitted

to Congress pursuant to the President's energy messages includes states,
political subdivisions and public or municipal corporations among the
entities that could be authorized to construct or operate deepwater port
faciiities beyond the three mile limit. 3
Concerning the investment of U. S. private capital in the requisite
super carriers, the Herchant !farine Act of 1970 has gone far to encourage
the development of a U. S. flag bulk carrier fleet capable of transporting
a reasonable proportion of our growing imports of petroleum and other bulk
commodities. 4

Indeed, the current shipbuilding "boom" in the United

1

U.S., Department of Commerce, l1aritime Administration, Office
of Research and DevelopIaent, Offshore TerIainal DevelopMent Project
(tlashington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, Sep t emb er 1971).
2

Three deepwater terminals are presently under active consideration:
Sea Dock, near Freeport, Texas; LOOP, near Grande Isle, Louisiana; and
one off Delaware.
3For a general discussion of the various planning and arrangements
for offshore port financing see Duncan C. Gray, "Sources of Funds
Required," Planning for Offshore Ports (llashinr,ton, D. C.: ~farine
Technology Society, 1974).
4U• S., Congress, House, Report of the Activities of the Herchant
Harine and Fisheries Committee, 9~D Congress (Hashington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 11.
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States is being fueled by the most liberal financing terms in history.

1

In contrast \vith the wo r Ldwd d e financing available for ships, the creditworthy U. S. flag shipping transaction can merit 100 percent financing -rather than the maximum 10 or 80 percent abroad; can be at a money cost
significantly lower -- by 3 to 5 percent; and, more important, can be a
fixed rate over a duration approximating the life of the ship (20 to 25
years) rather than the 8 to 12 year term customary elsewhere.

2

By the mid-1980's, the United States will have to import between 50
to 60 percent of its petroleum products, as compared to the 26 percent
we had currently imported prior to the oil embargo. 3

In terms of balance

of payments, the United States imported $3.6 billion worth of energy fuels
in 1911 while exporting only $1.5 billion -- primarily coal.

By 1985,

this balance-of-trade deficit for energy could rise to $25 billion
annually.

4

It should be generally conceded that the construction of cleepwat er
ports (be they monobuoys, fixed structures, floating or artificial islands
makes both economical and environmental sense.
however concern tanker moveoents.

The critical questions

It is, of course, obvious that for at

least the next decade, even with the President's Project Independence for
energy self-sufficiency, we will continue to be dependent upon foreign

1

Harine Engineering/Log (Ne\V' York:
Corporation, October 1913), pp. 21-33.

Simmons Boardman Publishing

2I bi d•
3U• S., Council on Environ~enta1 Quality, Energy and the
Environment (\1ashington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
August 1913), p. 7.
4 I b i d•

0(.
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sources for our energy supplies.

Shall we risk a dual dependency by

becoming dependent upon foreign bottoms to transport these fuels to our
shores?

As of December 31, 1971 the U. S. flag tanker fleet consisted

of 291 ships (both private and government ovned) with an average tonnage
of 27,000 DHT. l

To carry the projected crude imports i t is envisioned

that 200 supertankers (VLCC's)

\~ill

be needed, supplemented by 300 to 500

small shuttle tankers (although in some cases pipelines could be used)
for transshipment from U. S. offshore port facilities to major refineries
and distribution centers. 2

If offshore facilities are not constructed,

it has been estimated that 2,600 tankers, averaging about 47,000 D\IT each
to conform with existing port limitations on the East and Gulf Coasts,
would be required to meet future U. S. import requirements.

3

The crux of the problem is wha t should the "mix" be for the U. S.
flag tanker fleet, recognizing that the operating scenario lacks clear
definition.

As of December 31, 1973, there were 49 tankers under con-

struction or on order.

Of this total, 11 tankers are very large crude

carriers (VLeC's) ranging betueen 100,000 to 265,000 DHT; 13 are approximat.ely 90,000 mIT and 25 are less than 40,000 mIT. 4

1

U.

About one-half

s.,

Departnent of Commerce, Haritine Administration,
Government
Printing Office, 1972), PI'. 72-73.

A ~i2\-l \-,ave in American Shipping (\lashington, D. C.:

2Harine Engineering/Log (Hew York: Simmons Boardman
Publishing Corporation, April 1973), p. 5.
3aaritioe O-lasldngton, D. C.:
Departcent, Spring 1972), p. 5.
4

AFL-ClO Naritime Trades

U. S., Department of Commerce, ~1aritiT:le Administration
Tabulation, "Shipbuilding Contracts Under Xerchant Harine Act
of 1970," (1973).
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of these 49 tankers are covered by the Cost Differential Subsidy (CDS)
provision of the }ierchant Harine Act of 1970.

CDS applications pending

before the ~Iaritime Administration' 6 Suhsidy Board include an additional
.
1
98 tankers ranging in size from 00, 000 mIT to 400, 000 DWT.
These ships probably \"ill be ready for sea in the 1975 - 1978 time
frame, and they will be looking for both adequate cargos and port facilities.

To insure that there will be available cargos there is mounting

sentiment in the Congress to pass legislation allocating a certain percentage of U. S. oil imports for carriage in U. S. flag tankers.

During

the first and second sessions of the 92nd Congress, 182 Congressmen (42
percent of the House membership) sponsored or co-sponsored 26 separate
bills for allocating a certain percentage of U. S. oil imports for U. S.
flag ships.

One bill

(u.a.

13324) wouLd have required that 50 percent

of all U. S. oil imports be transported by U. S. flag ships.

The ex-

pressed purpose of the bill was to "as sur e that the United States does
not become wholly dependent on foreign vessels for its rapidly increasing
oil imports with resultant adverse implications for our national security,
balance of payments, domestic economy, and marine environment. 1t

Although

there was widespread Congressional support for this bill, it was defeated
in the Senate -- but only by seven votes.

Similar legislation is now

before the 93rd Congress and is being actively considered.

lU. S., Department of Commerce, tmritime Administration
Tabulation, Itpending Construction Differential Subsidy
Application,1t (1973).
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Another factor which must be recognized concerning our tanker mix is
the eventual completion of the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline

t~wse

sea leg will

consist of 011 being transported from Valdez, Al.aska to I-Jest Coast r efineries and to a Panama lstllmus transshipment point.

Carrying oil be-

tween domestic ports (Valdez to West Coast ports) will be restricted tu

u. S. flag vessels as governed by the Herchant Ilarine Act of 1920 C'The
Jones Act").

Section 27 of that Act stipulates:

That no merchandise shall be transported by water, or
by land and wa t e r , on penalty of forfeiture thereof,
between points in the United States, including
Districts, Territories, and possessions thereof embraced Hi thin the coa s twf se laws, either directly or
via a foreign port, or for any part of the transportation, in any other vessel than a vessel built in
and documented under the laws of the United States
and Otmed by persons who are citizens of the United
States • • •
The make-up of our tanker fleet is further complicated by the current limitations associated with construction subsidies.
t~rine

The Merchant

Act of 1970 provides for a Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS)

to encourage U. S. built ships.

Its success is evident with the order

backlog of U. S. shipyards at a peacetime high.

In addition, pending CDS

applications, which totaled lSO ships (both tankers and non-tankers) as of
the first of this year, are far in excess of the 30 ships per year target
of the Act.

llith CDS funding limited to $300 million annually, how should

the dollars be apportioned among the various vessel applicants?

1

lYor a discussion of this particular problem see Henry S. Harcus,
"The Need to Redefine the Objectives of the U. S. Ila r Lt Lme Subsidy Progran," Proceedings of the Harine Technology Society (September 1973),
pp. 565-577.
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The issue of government-subsidized tanker construction becomes more
perplexing when the environmental issue is introduced.
mental groups, in

1~72,

Various environ-

had obtained a court order to halt the contractinp,

for subsidized tanker construction until the :Iaritime Administration filed
an environcental impact statement.

1

An impact statement was eventually

filed, under protest, and in the Fall of 1973, the environmentalists,
somewhat satisfied that certain environmental protection equipment (such
as anti-collision radar and inert-gas tank blanketing systems)
required, decided against further court action.

2

,~ere

being

The really expensive

requirements such as double bottoms and segregated ballast tanks are
still generally in abeyance.
Intergovernmental

~1aritime

Although agreenent Has reached at the recent

Consultative Organization for segregated bal-

last tanks in new tankers, the agreement does not become operative until
ratified by 15 or more countries representing 50 percent of world tonnage.

3

Since CDS funding is limited by statute to a fixed percentage,

the imposition of environmental protection features either not required
or exceeding the standards of foreign ships could easily negate the value
of the CDS allowance.

4

The alternatives are then the establishment of

1

Harine Engineering/Log (New York:
Corporation, October 1973), p. 9.

Simcons Boardman Publishing

2 I bi d •
3shipyard l"eekly ('i-lashington, D. C.:
America, llovember 8, 1973).
4

Shipbuilders Council of

The Herchant Harine Act of 1970 provides for diminishing levels
of the Construction Differential Subsidy starting with 45% of domestic
building cost in 1971 and declining 2% each year until a maximum of 35%
is reached in 1976. The drop of the subsidy base will require a substantial reduction in the cost of ships constructed in U. S. shipyards.
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uniform international standards, legislating an offsettinn adjustment in
the CDS percentage, or, all else failing, having tIle owner opt for the
less costly foreign flag vessel.
Let us consider one final facet of the oil transport picture -refining capacity.

In 1970. there were 268 refineries in the U. S. 'dth

an average daily capacity of about 50.000 barrels.

To keep pace with the

projected demand, it has been deternined that we will require by 1980 the
equivalent of 58 new refineries with an average capacity of 160, 000 bar r e Ls
per day. 1

To date, only one new refinery is under construction.

Recog-

nizing the environmental pressures concerning refinery construction.
particularly since the preferred siting is generally in the already overburdened coastal zone, just how does the U. S. accor:unodate this needed
refining capacity.

Perhaps offshore refineries offer the solution, par-

ticularly when it is desirable to have your refinery centers in proximity
to the areas of heaviest energy consumption.
today:

Consider the situation

the Gulf Coast currently has only 16 percent of the U. S. energy

demand. but has about 40 percent of the country's refining capacity.
The East Coast. on the other hand. has 40 percent of the demand but only
12 percent of the refining capacity.2

Although it has been estimated

that roughly a 50 percent expansion of refining capacity is possible at
existing sites. 3

perhaps the ultimate solution is the construction of

offshore refineries.
1 Ocean Industry (Houston. Texas:
August 1972). pp. 38-44.

The Gulf Publishing Company.

2I b i d •

3 u • S•• Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Quality
The Fourth Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality
OJashington. D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 207-203.
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In any event, it is evident that oil transport offers tremendous
economic opportunities for the United States.

How successful we \olill be

in realizing these economies depends upon our ability to treat our transportation system in its totality -- a process which has yet to be adequately demonstrated -- for. in summarizing. several issues remain to be
confronted and resolved.

Specifically, ,",hat is needed includes the

fo l.l.owi.ng r

To enact appropriate lecislation to permit the construction
of deepwater, super tanker port facilities.
To assess U. S. flag tanker fleet requirenents (as well as
offshore port facility needs) in terms of Project Independence • . • achieving self-sufficiency in energy by 1980.
To determine the major sources of oil. These sources could
range from the U. S. Outer Continental Shelf, the Arctic,
or Middle ~ast. Each of these sources places a different
set of requirements on the shipping industry and the tanker
mix.
To enact oil cargo preference legislation to insure a fixed
quota of the oil trade is reserved for U. S. flag tankers.
As expressed by the President's Commission on American
Shipbuilding:
Because of the increasing bilateral trade pressure
from developing and oil-producing nations, because
of the increasingly assertive participation of
state-owned fleets in shipping, and because of the
past reluctance of U. S. oil companies to build
and operate U. S. flag tankers, it appears necessary that a quota of the petroleum and gas trade
be reserved for efficient and competitive U. S.
built. U. S. manned ships if the United States is
to l~ve a significant portion of this transportation under its control and to have the capability
to build and repair the necessary vessels. l
lReport of the Commission on American Shipbuildin& (Hashington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, October 1973).
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To develop a national position in the event of pressure
from oil-producing nations to dictate oil carriaee requirements. Again, quoting from the Repo rt; of the
Commission on American Shipbuilding:
The Department of State has pointed out, in
Congressional hearings, that Iraq and the
Arab Federation of Egypt, Libya, and Syria
have announced plans to establish oil tanker
fleets. Venezuela, KUHait, and Snudi Arabia
have also expressed similar goals. By virtue
of their control of the oil itself, there is
little doubt that the oil-producing nations
have the powe r to require that their tonnage
carry a portion of their oil exports • • •
The United States faces this world situation
without the national objertives \lhich are so
clear in other countries.
To review both the adequncy and apportionnent of
Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS) funds particularly in relation to world shipbuilding activity.
For example, at the end of 1973 there Here 3,359
merchant ships under construction or on order in the
major shipbuilding countries and tankers represented
75.7 percent of the tota1. Z As commented upon in
the Harine Engineering/Log:
H11ile nothing is certain in the shipping business,
the present uncertainties of the oil situation
\-lould se.em to indicate that this huge order book
of tankers is more than the \lor1d fleet Hould need
in the foreseeable future. 3
The Arab oil embargo has produced a panoply of energy-related issues,
and the character and viability of the U. S. merchant marine Hill be determined by the pursuant policies and planning actions of the U. S. govern'"
mente

2Harine Engineerin{}/Log (Nom York:
Corporation, February 1974), p. 116.

Simmons Boardman Publishing

Unitized Cargos
The techniques which have been pioneered by United States technology
include, initially, the pallet ship, the conta:l.ner ship, the barge-c ar rvf.ng
ship (LASH and SEABEE), and, ultimately, the nuc Lea r epower ed ba r ge-ica r ry t ng
ship.

Figure (2) shows the economic advantages which accrue from imple-

mentation of each mode of unitization.

The cost savings are large indeed.

The United States' experience with respect to the realization of the
economies of unitized cargos has again been one of bright promise accompanied by much frustration.

The achievement of unitization brings with it

a substantially higher productivity per laborer on the docks and a blurrin!,
of distinction bet\leen teamster and longshoreman functions.

As seen from

figure (2) this is not an incremental percentage gain in productivity but
a multiplication in

prod~ctivity

by factors as high as five.

As viewed by the unions, parsimony

,~ith

respect to sharing the bene-

fits of such modernization with labor resulted in a costly national strike
in 1972 which affected the balance of trade and delayed the national realization of the economics of unitization.

1

Additional difficulties have

resulted from the manner in which container ships must operate.

Specif-

ica11y, the economics of an efficient container ship operation dictate

lIn 1972, two longshore contract disputes caused a lJ5-day work
stoppage at Pacific Coast ports and a 57-day stoppaee at Atlantic and
Gulf Coast ports. [See U. S•• Department of Commerce, naritime
Administration, A Ne,~ \~ave in American Shipping (Hashington, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 37.]
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FIGURE (2)
TOTAL PORT COST PER TON FOR BREAK-BULK AND UNITIZED SHIPS
(All Units Door to Door)
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The total port cost per ton for the container ship is
that of the combined roll-on/roll-off. lift-on/lift-off
container berth.

SOURCE: Arthur D. Little. Inc •• Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development.
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keeping the number of port calls to a minimum.

Cargos can be funneled to

their ultimate destinations through a relatively sm3ll number of ports with
economic advantages to the carrier.

This. of course. presents a serious

problem to those ports being denied direct vessel services.

This poses the

threat of ports claiming unjust discrimination and seeking recourse through
the Federal regulatory agencies.
ically the Federal

~~ritirne

1

These same regulatory agencies. specif-

Commission and the Interstate Commerce

Commission. are also trying to resolve conflicting regulatory statutes
which are inhibiting the optimum movement of unitized cargos.

At present.

intennodal freight cannot be shipped through to its destination using a
single bill of lading and a single rate.
To correct this situation. H.R. 15465 (liThe Intermodal Bill") was
introduced in the 92nd Congress to facilitate "through interrnodal freight
movements involving offshore marine transportation."
a nev type of carrier -- the "InterI:lodal Carrier"

The bill wo uld create
who would offer a

through service to the shipper utiliziuf, a single bill of lading. quoting
one simple rate for the entire shipment from point of origin to point of
destination. and being fully responsible for all liability concerning the
shipment.
In providing this service." the Intermodal Carrier. in addition to
utilizing its

o~m

facilities. could also utilize the facilities of other

"underlying carriers. 1I

1

The Intermodal Carrier could be a rail carrier. a

U. S •• Federal ~britirne Commission. Tenth Annual Report
(Washington. D. C.: Governmen t Printing Office. 1971). pp. 15-16.
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motor carrier, or an ocean carrier.

Thus, an ocean carrier acting as an

Intermodal Carrier could offer a through service at a single rate for a
shipment from reoria, Illinois to Milan, Italy uSlne an unaerlying rail
carrier to the Port of New York, then its ovn vessel from

NC\-7

York to a

port in Italy, and then to 11i1an using the facilities of an Italian inland
transportation system, either rail or motor carrier.

The obvious aclvantag

of this method is the shipper deals only with one carrier (the Intermoda1
Carrier), is quoted one rate, uses only one shippine document, and looks
only to the Intermoda1 Carrier to resolve what eve r problems may arise.
Regulatory responsibility over the through movement and through rate would
be vested in the Federal

?~ritime

Commission.

The increasing use of containers has necessitated expansion at several U. S. ports.

Prompting such moves usually is the substantial acreage

needed for container marshalling yards.

Recognizing the growf.ng expense

and difficulties associated with coastal zone land acquisition for industrial usage, the employment of heavy-lift helicopters could offer a
viable alternative.

Specifically, marshalling yards could be placed

further inland witl! the helicopter prOViding the transportation link between the yard and port.

This system would ease both the strain of coasta

zone development and motor-carrier traffic to and from the port.
As shown in figures (3), (4), (5) and (6) the United States has
experienced and continues to experience a declining share of the transportation market.

As compensating factors, the U. S. is no,,, the leader

in barge-on-board (or lighter-aboard) ships (LASH and SEABEE) and an
increase in domestic shipbuilding has been experienced as a result of the

"
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U.S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE:

FIGURE (4)

COMMERCIAL CARGO CARRIED [TONNAGE]
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Total Tons (Millions)
U.S. Flag Tons
U.S. Percent of Total

289.3
50.8
17.6

253.3
30.9
12.2

267.0
27.1
10.2

277.9
31.0
11.1

272.4
26.3
9.7

296.8
29.6
10.0

311.6
28.5
9.2

332.8
30.5
9.2

371.3
27.7
7.5

392.3
26.2
6.7

387.6
20.5
5.3

418.6
25.0
6.0

426.1
19.1
4.5

473.2
25.2
5.3

456.9
24.3
5.3

liner TOlal Tons
liner U.S. Flag Tons
liner U.S. Percent

46.7
17.8
38.0

43.4
14.0
32.3

48.1
13.5
28.1

50.7
14.5
28.6

49.0
12.6
25.8

48.3
12.7
26.2

48.9
13.5
27.7

50.3
14.2
28.1

49.2
11.2
22.8
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24.0

41.0
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21.0

Non-Liner Total Tons
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Non-liner U.S. Flag Tons 16.2
12.0
Non-liner U.S. Percent

105.1
8.8
8.4

106.9
8.2
7.7

109.0
8.4
7.7

106.7
7.8
7.3

125.2
8.3
6.7

136.2
8.2
6.0

161.4
9.8
6.1

171.6
8.2
4.8

189.5
6.9
3.6
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5.4
2.8
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6.4
3.0

211.6
4.4
2.1

240.7
5.4
2.2

216.2
4.7
2.2

Tanker Total Tons
Tanker U.S. Flag Tons
Tanker U.S. Percent

107.5

104.8

116.7

121.1

6~

6~

15.7

7.6

6.9

5.1

5.4

5.4

149.3
4.5
3.0

163.1
7.5
4.6

173.5
5.5
3.2

182.1

5~

150.5
8.2
5.5

152.8

8~

123.3
8.5
6.9

126.5

8~

112.0
5.4
4.8

118.2

16~

192.0
9.4
4.9

CALENDAR YEAR

7~

5.2

"Prehminarv data subject to future revision.

SOURCE: U. S., Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration,
A New Wave in American Shipping, 1972.
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U. S. OCEANBORNE FOREIGN TRADE:

FIGURE (5)
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U.S. Flag Value ($ billions)
U.S. Percent of Total

22.8
7.3
32.1

20.9
6.0
28.6

22.8
6.0
26.1

24.7
6.5
26.4

24.7
6.3
25.6

25.9
6.5
25.1

27.5
6.9
25.1

30.0
7.7
25.8

32.4
6.9
21.4

36.4
8.2
22.5

36.6
7.9
21.7

41.1
8.5
20.7

41.7
8.0
19.2

49.7
10.3
20.7

50.7
10.0
19.8

Liner Total Value
Liner U.S Flag Value
Liner U.S. Percent

16.4
6.4
39.1

15.3
5.4
35.3

16.8
5.5
32.5

18.5
5.9
32.1

18.3
5.7
31.4

18.9
5.8
30.1

19.5
6.2
31.5

21.3
7.0
32.8

22.3
6.2
27.8

24.8
7.5
30.4

24.8
7.4
29.8

26.8
7.8
29.0

27.0
7.4
27.3

33.5
9.7
28.8

33.0
9.3
28.2

Non-Liner Total Value
Non-Liner U.S. Flag Value
Non-Liner U.S. Percent

4.0
.5
12.6

3.4
.3
9.2

3.7
.3
8.4

3.6
.3
9.0

3.7
.4
10.6

4.3
.4
9.6

5.2
.5
9.6

5.9
.5
8.6

6.6
.4
6.3

8.2
.4
4.9

8.6
.4
4.5

10.8
.5
4.6

11.0
.4
3.8

12.2
.4
3.3

12.8
.4
3.5

Tanker Total Value
Tanker U.s Flag Value
Tanker U.S. Percent

2.4
.4
16.8

2.2
.3
11.4

2.3
.2
7.5

2.6
.3
10.4

2.7
.2
7.3

2.7
.3
9.4

2.8
.2
9.0
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.2
8.8

3.5
.3
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.3
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3.2
.2
4.8

3.4
.2
6.6

3.6
.2
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4.0
.2
5.6

4.9
.3
5.7

-Prcliminarv data subject to future revision.
Note: Includes Covcrnmcru sponsored cargo; excludes Department of Defense cargo and U.S./Canada translakcs cargo.

SOURCE: U. S•• Department of Commerce. Haritime Administration.
A New Wave in American Shipping. 1972.
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Herchant Harine Act of 1970.

Although American shipbuilding is at a rec-

ord peacetime high, nothing has yet transpired to indicate that the new
capabUity \"Ul do more than maintain current relative world ranking of
the fleet.

I

Of additional concern is the trend of events wi t h respect to nuclear

11

As shown in figure (7), short-term economic gain accrues

\

merchant ships.

from utilization of large size, nuclear-powered ships in commercial service.

Recognizing that this comparative analysis

\-I8S

I

prepared before the

I

\

current oil shortage, circumstances nov appear to be combining to make more:

at tractive the poss iL ility of eonst rue t ing nucLea r-powered U. S. f Lag mer-I!
chant ships.

Bunker fuel prices are now 200% more than the 1972 price of

$2.50 a barrel, and it is expected that costs will shortly hit $9.00 a
barrel.

1

The Federal Haritime Cor:unission is currently seeking to hammer out a
formula which will permit steamship lines and carrier groups to impose
bunker fuel surcharges to offset the skyrocketing cost of operating merchant ships.

These escalating bunker fuel prices are also causing ship

operators, as an economy measure, to limit the number of U. S. ports serviced at a time when the devaluation of our dollar is increasing the amount
of U. S. exports, particularly to Western Europe.
Legislation is now before Congress (H.R. 7694) that would establish
a nuclear merchant ship incentive support program by providing federal
support payments to cover "such portion of the construction cost difference
arising from the use of nuclear propulsion units • • • necessary for the
purpose of fostering the advance of U. S. flag maritime technology.
lLarry C. Hanning, "Atoms at Sea," Sealift (\-lashington, D. C.:
!'Iilitar S~alift COIllI!l~nd. Januar

"
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Such p<lyments tvou1d be repayed by the recipients throueh recapture of 20
percent of the nuclear ship's annual net operating income until tile full
amount of incentive

pa}~ents

are recovered.

1

Although the prospects for building nuclear merchant ships appear
brighter, the Administration does not support the program envisioned by
H.R. 7694 because of lingering questions as to economic feasibility,
licensing and regulation, safety, financial responsibility, third party
?

liability, indemnification Lfmf t s and international reactions. ~
Neam"hi1e, the foreign trend t ovar d nuc Lea r-epower ed ships, as ill ustrated by figure (8), continues.

Unless the United States shortly over-

comes its current cautious approach, it will lead to domination in this
area by Japan, \-lest Germany, and !lussia.

If this occurs, it will serve

as another example of \vhere the U. S. failed to exploit its technological
lead, thus allo\1ing others to acquire the doninant positions.

(For added

emphasis, it should be noted that the nuclear pouer plant of the West
German ship Otto Hahn is a U. S. designed system.)

IIhe cost estimates vary for construction of a nuclear-powered
merchant ship, as compared to a conventionally-powered ship. For
example, a 400,000 D~~ conventionally-po~1ered tanker costs approximately $125 million. Estimates for a comparable nuclear-powered
ship range from $40 to $100 million more.
2Shipyard Heekly (Hashington, D. C.:
America, ~Iovember 8, 1973).

Shipbuilders Council of

~--.

\mr..LDHIDE NUCLEAR PROPULSION ACTIVITY

FIGURE (8)
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Specialty Carriers and Offshore Platforms
Accompanying the development of supertankers and cargo ships has been
an additional class of specialty carriers.

These include LNG (liquid

natural gas) ships, aBO (ore/bulk/ore) ships, RO/RO (roll-on/roll-off)
carriers, mobile offshore drilling rigs, oceangoing tug-supply vessels,
workover units and pipe burying barges.

The full panoply of industrial

ships of massive scale has resulted in the movement of heavy industry to
the coastal zone in order to minimize transportation costs and optimize
on ocean transport.

This has been particularly true in Japan, the

Uetherlands, Sweden, and Germany.

1

In major sllipyard modernization alone,

future investment plans are expected to total more than $350 million because of the interest of American shipyards in entering the world market
for the construction of LNG ships and the requirements of the Alaskan oil
trade.

2

Such developments have not been without effect beyond purely economic
tenus.

Each new and expanded industry has resulted in a consumptive use

of the already crowded coastline and has. added to the pollution problem of
bays and estuaries.

The logical step beyond coastal location is that

of outward movement to fixed or floating stable platforms or artificial

IV. S., Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Institute
fur \~ater Resources, Foreign j)eep \later Port Developments, 3 vols
(December 1971).
2U• S., Department of Conunerce, :laritime Adrad.n Ls t r a t ion, A new
Have in Ar.lerican Shipping (\.Jashington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1972), p. 13.
32

JJ
Lo l.ancla Lo c a t cd uell beyond interference \J:!.th other competing uses of the

zone.

Accompany Lng this industrial novcmen t has been the development of

platform and island designs for a multitude of functions.
An analysis of both stahle platforms and artificial islands in marine
enterprises has demonstrated their cost effectiveness in such applications
as offshore petroleum drilling, oil refineries and storage, ocean mining
and dredging, fishing and fis11 processinz, energy generation, harbors, airports, oceanographic research stations, and even urban living and recreatioT
centers.

1

Integration of these functions, Hhere feasible, on single plat-

forms or in platform complexes could achieve the full economic benefit and
enhance the investment.
United States development in this total set of industrial complexes
is presently liI:lited to the offshore oil platform and offshore oil storage,
and a few specific projects,

such as offshore d eepwa t e r port facilities

for VLCC's and floating nuclear power plants.

2

Aside from these, a coheren

and total national program for ocean platform development does not now ex I s •
In evaluating the significance of this deficiency, it should be

reempha~ize

that offshore facilities locate industries for which pollution control on
land is difficult, if not \lell nigh impossible, in a controllable environment, and provide structures in vat er s whLc h , w Lt ho ut dredging, are deep

1

H. R. Talkington, "Transfer of Navy Platform Technology to Solution
of Societal Problems," Journal of the :!arine Technology Society (January February 1973), pp. 56-60; G. Schreuder and C. Stigter, Sea Island Project
(N.V. Holland: Bos Kalis Westminster Dredging Group, ~~rch 1972).
2

u. S., National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere, Second
Annual Report of the ~':ational Advisory COr.u:littee on Oceans and Atmosphe.re
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, June 1973), pp. 16-23.
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enough to qualify as deep",ater harbors.

-The cost of .:.uch facilities nppeClrs

to be competitive i f not super Lor to coastal counterparts, and they can be
built \-lithout uprooting and Lnt er r er Lng Hith existing enjoyment of the land
and coastal zone.

A further advantaee of floating facilities is their

ability to be relocated in response to demographic change.

-"
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Marine-Based Transit Systems
No discussion of marine transportation would be complete without some
reference made to the movement of goods and people to the coastal zone and
to the inland.
There are more than 25,000 miles of navigable i.n1and waterways
serving almost every concentration of the nation's heavy industry and
its most efficient farming areas.

It has been cstiI'l8ted that on the

river one dollar will produce 300 miles of service; by rail, the same
amount will produce 66 miles and by truck, 15 miles.

l

These economies

can best be seen in the fact that inland barges perform ten percent of
the inter-city ton miles and receive in revenues half of one percent of
?

the nation's freight bill. ~

lHth a national annual inter-city freight

bill of approximately $80 billion, there is an inherent national potential for savings whLch is measured in billions of dollars if substantial
increments of inter-city freight are shifted from land to water.

The

trend has been for industries to move to the river bank wher e they can
take direct advantage of the economies of barge transportation for their
raw materials and products.

But, almost as important, they can play the

lJ. A. Cr eedy , "The Potential of Our Inland ~"aterway,"
Proceedings of the ~~rine Technology Society (September 1973),
pp. 401-408.
2

Ibid.
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barge lines against the railroads and achieve so-called "wa t cr-ecompe l.Lcd"
rail rate reductions.

Such reductions ranee up to 60 percent and have

tended to accelerate the movement of industry to the river banks.

1

The advent of the container sh:l.p and harge/1ighter ship have hrought
a net" international dimension in international trade to the river system.
For containerized cargos, ocean carriers and inland transportation componies have developed facilities and procedures for handling intermoda1
movements to and fron the ports.

But intermoda1ism has not developed as

rapidly as has been hoped for in the United States.

The principal prob-

1em is caused by the conflicting standards of our rer,ulatory laws.

Thus

far, carriers have only extended through services under single factor
rate-making to so-called landbridge and ninihridge services hetween ports
Truly integrated services are not yet offered to and from inland points
under through rate and through route arrangeMents.

The greatest cha1-

lenge facing our ocean shipping system is to begin to accept general
cargo ocean transportation as a link in an integrated "origin-todestination" system.

2

If containerization is to approach its true

potential, regulatory impedinents must he resolved.
Correspondingly, the barge carrying ships (LASH and SEABEE) have
served to extend shipping services to river ports or other ocean ports
which could not accommodate the deep-draft "nother ship".

Like the

container ship, these vessels open a neu means of through transportation.

IJ. A. Creedy, "The Potential of Our Inland H'atertJay,"
Proceedings of the Harine Technology Society (September 1973),
pp. 401-408.
2R• P. lIolubowicz, "The Challenge Facing the Ocean Shipping
Industry, II Haritime Reporter/Engineering Neto1S (~ray 15, 1972),
pp. 19-21.
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Eighty percent of the metropolitan areas in the United
States are located near a body of water -- an ocean.
lake. river. estuary. sound. or bay. Some 90 million
people live and work close to water. In view of these
facts it is not surprising that it appears feasible to
expect that by 1980 one-half million urbanites in some
30 cities could utilize over-the-water craft daily as
their primary mode of transportation. Stich a turn of
events would result in 200.000 fewer private cars in
downt.own business areas daily. 12.000 new jobs in
manufacturing and operatin~ the system. a higher
quality of life for many city dwellers. and a number
of secondary benefits not yet clearly perceived. l
The reality of the situation. however , 11'1 that the movement of people has
undergone the same characteristic development dilemna that has been seen
in the other forms of maritime COmr:lerce.

U. S. technology has developed

hydrofoil craft. air-cushion vehicles. surface-effect vehicles. and
captured-bubble craft.

At present. though. few if any of these advanced

I

marine craft are in commercial service in the United States.

In contrast~

the Soviet Union has more than JOO regularly scheduled commercial hydrofoil services

operatin~

on its inland waterways and canals.

Cities of

the United States are similarly linked. and the development of marine
mass transit should be developed as a viable transportation mode.

2

It

1

U. S •• Department of Transportation. Urban Nass Transportation
Administration. Over-the-Water Program Design. by P... Kr zycz kows kf ,
Report No. UHTA-r;~T-RDC-8-71-l (December 1971).
2public Law 92-374 ("Hydrofoil Ships"). enacted in 1972. acknowledges the perfection of the hydrofoil concept to the point wher e large.
high speed (over 40 knots) ships may be built for the carriage of freight
and passengers. The Act. therefore. permits favorable Federal ship
nortgage insurance for hydrofoils and other surface-effect ships whLch
meet nininum speed and horsepower requi.rements w i t hou t regard to tonnage.

I

\
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should be noted that the benefits whLch could accrue from the development

I

of such a system have drawn the notice of industry and various cities.
Hawa I f , for example, is studying the Il3\vC\ii Environmental Area tk1SS

Transi t (HEART) System whLch \,ri1l utilize the ocean as the expr es svay
with bO.:lts operating on the existing canals and streams for the local
loops.

1

An integrated marine-based transit system contains the seeds of
promise for energy .conservation and for the solution of a large number
of coastal energy consumptive and environmental coastal zone problems
1

of our society.

For example, water transportation harge service requires I

less energy per ton-mile than any other method of freight distribution.
Water freight requires 500 BTU's of energy for every ton-mile of freight
moved; rail freight requires 750 BTU's per ton-mile; pipelines 1,850
BTU's per ton-mile; trucks 2,400 BTU's of energy per ton-mile; and air
cargo 6,300 BTU's per ton-mile. 2

Several studies have also demonstrated

the efficacy of a water-oriented mass transit system.

3

Coupled wLt h the movement of freight and people is the advent of
offshore oil terminals and a projected (by the end of the century)

1,000 nuclear power plants, the

~ajority

of which, in all probability,

~1. A. Lucas, "l-Iarine Hass Transit for Hawa Ld, A Case Study,"
Proceedings of the }~rine Technology Societ~ (September 1973),
pp. 377-383.
2

Big Load Afloat (Washington, D. C.:
Operators, 1973).

American Waterways

3See William H. Shultz, "Status of Domestic High-Speed :Iarine
Vehicles for Ha ss Transit," Proceedings of the :1arine Technology
Societl (September 1973), pp. 409-419.

If
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\.ri11 be locatcd offshorc on floating platforms.

1

What is therefore

suggested. is that the surface of the ocean. the coastal zone. and the
coastal canals and waterwaya be reserved for rapid marine transit of
goods, s.e.rviccs and people be tween offshore facilities, from offshore
facilities to the shore. and between coastal, riverine, and canal
coramunities.

2

If the marine transit system could be developed on a national

scale, it could help solve many urban and industrial problems of the
coastal zone.

lU. S., National Advisory Corr~ittee on Oceans and Atmosphere,
Second Annual Report (1Jashington. D. C.: Government Printing Office,
June 1973).
2

John P. Craven, "Offshore Platforms and Superports: Technical
Considerations," The Oceans and National Economic Development
(~'lashin8ton, D. C.:
Government Printing Office, December 1973),
pp. 230-232.
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Shipbuilding and Ship Repair

In reviewing the shipbuilding and ship repair capabilities of the
United States, which, of course, are major components of the maritime
industry, discussion will be focused on tankers since they represent the
cOn1ncrcial behemoths.
\vhereas, in recent history, with fet-! exc ep t Loris , Amer i can shipyards
were building small tankers in the range of 30,000 - 50,000 DHT, the
orderbook today for the U. S. shipbuilding industry includes tankers up
to and including 265,000

m:T.

Additionally, there nrc app l Lca t Ions
m~T).

pending for tankers in the ultra-large category (400, 000+

T\-1O shipyards -- Bethlehem Steel Corporation, Spar r ows Point,
:~ryland

and Seatrain Shipbuildine Corporation. Brooklyn, New York

are currently engaged in the construction of 265,000

mrr

and 225,000

mIT

VLCC's, respectively • . Bethlehem has recently indicated that 350,000 D1IT,
or slightly larger, VLCC's may be built at Spa r r ows Point.

1

The new facilities in three other yards \.,ill be able to accommodate
even larger vessels.

llewport Ne\"s Sh Lpbu Ll d Lng Corporation, l':e\-!port NeHS

Virginia will be able to build VLCC's as large as 600, 000

mIT.

Avondale

Shipyards, Incorporated, He\" Orleans, Louisiana and Sun Shipbuilding and
Dry Dock Company, Chester, Pennsylvania could construct 1.00, 000 mIT
VLCC's.2

lEdwin H. Hood, Speech delivered before the Propeller Club
of Newpo r t News , Virginia, 12 December 1973.
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Another shIpyard -- Touu Shipyards Corporation, Galveston, Texas -has completed plans for

a np\'! f ac tl

ity

c apab l,e

of bui1dinr; ULCC' s ,

In

addition, the existing facilities of General Dynamics Corporation, Quincy
(l'lassachusetts) Shipbuild:l.ng Division and Ingalls Shipbuilding Divir.ion of
Litton Industries, Incorporated, Pascagoula, Mississippi, could he adapted
for the construction of 225,000 DIIT and 265,000 n~IT VLCC's, respectively. 1
HUh the exception of the SS Hnnhattan of 110,000 DHT delivered in

late 1962, American shipyards have been building the supertankers of yester
day.

Today, the U, S. shipbuilding Industry is moving into a new era of

production capabilities and rapidly moving toward new market opportunities
for the supertankers of

tomo r row

The ambiguities of present-day \lor1d oil diplomacy not\'lithstandinp"
the international demand for t anlce r transport of oil and p,as is not expected to subside,

It has been forecast that the Hor1d tanker fleet \1il1

increase, on a tonnage basis, by 4,7 percent each year until 1990,
characteristics of that fleet \-1il1 change considerably,

nut the

In 1975, it has

been predicted that 47 percent of the tonnage of these tankers ,·Ji1l be
vessels of 150,000 DlIT and over,

The comparable figure in the same cate-

gory for 1980 has been placed at 65 percent, and for 1990 at 76 percent.
It is interestinp, to note that, as of mid-1973, there were nearly 500
tankers of 150,000 mIT and over under construction or on order throughout
the wo r Ld,

Included were more than 20 ULCC's of 400,000 DIIT and over,

2

-

-

-------------
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Turning for a moment to the U. S. capability for construction of
nuclear-powered merchant ships. at least four of the aforementioned 5hipyards possess the know-how to build nuclear merchant ships, and at least
four U. S. producers of reactors possess the know-how to engage in marine
applications of nuclear power.

Unfortunately. the technological lead ac-

quireu as a result of building and operating the NS Savannah, the world's
first nuclear-powered merchant vessel, has been quickly lost by default.
Our national follow-up, to date, has been confined to a comparatively low
level of study effort.

these portents.

:-reanwhile. from the baseline of U. S. nuclear

With the troublesome shortfalls in energy supplies. the

legislation now before Congress (B.R. 7694) has a special relevance.
Efficient transportation under U. S. jurisdiction and the capabilities to
build in our own shipyards. ships of maximum productivity reflecting our
superiority in nuclear techno Logy are important to a rational solution of
our pressing energy needs.

It has been estimated, for example. that to

operate a fleet of 300 (the numerical objective of the Herchant Harine Act
of 1970) fossil-fueled modern merchant ships over their design lifetime
will require more than the estimated resources of the entire commercial
Alaskan North Slope oil field.

1

Considering these requirements. passage

of H. R. 7694 could well prompt the construction of high speed nuclear
merchant ships.

1

Subsidies -- Sea Pm ... e r ,

43
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The c.hanging character of the world fleet brings us to the subject of
ship repair capability.

For maintenance such

ClR

routine voyage repairs,

::S:::Sw::-::rb:n:"::::t:no:tt:em::::~g :~:Y;o:U~::::c::::S:::Yr::a::eo:e:::

r- ==

I
I

.1

underwater portions of a hull, rudder, propeller and propeller shaft, and

I!
II

for scraping and painting a hull hottom, a ship must be made "high and

I

dry."

of class, vessels be surveyed in drydock at specified intervals.

On these

surveys, the stern, keel, stem, frame or stern post, rudder, and outside
plating are cleaned and examined with propellers, streets, and sea chests,
together with their strainers and fastenings.
is usually checked at this time.

The stern bearing clearance

Special periodical surveys at four-year

intervals also require drydocking, as do some damage surveys.

this.
the

II

In addition, classification societies require that, for maintenance

Because of

II
II
I,1'1
II[

II

II

e sLz es of a repair yard's drYdo:ks and the cranes serving them arell
measures of their yard's "capacity."
II
th

bUiltI:oa:c:::::d:::t:::p:O::::i:::.:::s::n:.:::~::of:::~it::Sp:::e::~ng

I

there are fifteen repair yards \·lith seventeen drydocks of 300,000 DWT
capacity or over.

2

JI

(See figure 9)

Unfortunately, the capacity of U. S. private ship repair yards to dry
dock VLCC's/ULCC's is presently limited.

No commercial facilities are

available on the East Coast, though a drydock capable of lifting 120,000

lSurveyor (HeH York:
p. 8.

American Bureau of Shipping, November 1973),
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Figure 9

Country

Yard and
Location

Dock
Length
(in It)

Bahrain

New yard

NA

Brazil

New dock RIo area

Dubal

Dubai Drydock

Dock
Width
(in It)

Maximum
Depth over
keel blocks
(in It)

NA

NA

Capacity
(in dwt)
400,000

Status
1975 opening

NA

NA

NA

400,000

NA

1,361

243

40

500,000

1976 opening

1,361

216

40

500,000

1976 opening

1,722

328

40

1.000,000

1976 opening

France

Terrin Marseilles

1,535

281

NA

700,000

1974 opening

Germany

Blohm & Voss Hamburg

1,149

184

30

300,000

In operation

Grand Canary Is.

New yard

Two docks of 300.000 and 500.000

Possible 1976 completion

Holland

Verolme Rotterdam

1,329

295

35

500.000

In operation

Italy

CNTR/OARN Genoa

1,155

260

33

350,000

NA

CNTR Palermo

1,220

225

NA

400,000

1975 completion

Japan

SEBN Naples

1,320

240

NA

500.000

NA

Hakodate Hakodate

1,132

190

26

300,000

In operation

Hitachi Sakai

1,493

207

36

400,000

In operation

IHI Aioi

1,115

184

26

300,000

In operation

IHI Taniyama

NA

NA

NA

IHI Yokohama

1,174

184

28

300,000

In operation

Kawasaki Sakaide

1,476

236

27

500,000

In operation

Koyo Mihara

1,148

184

NA

300,000

1974 completion

1,000,000

1978 opening

Mitsubishi Honmoku

1.148

190

29

400,000

In operation

Mitsubishi Koyagi

1.312

328

NA

500,000

In operation

Mitsubishi Nagasaki

1,155

185

31

300,000

In operation

Mitsui Yura

1,150

213

33

330,000

In operation

Nippon Kokan Tsu

1.230

246

30

500,000

In operation

Nippon Kokan Kiire

NA

NA

NA

1,000,000

Possible 1978 opening
In operation

Sasebo Sasebo

1.214

230

49

500,000

Malaysia

Malaysia SY Johore Bahru

1,270

264

NA

400,000

1975 completion

Malta

Malta Drydocks

1,260

200

NA

300,000

Construction begins 1974

Portugal

Lisnave Lisbon

1,148

177

34

326,000

I n operation

1,180

177

20

326,000

In operation

1,706

295

40

1,000,000

In operation

1,150

180

NA

300,000

1,485

245

NA

700,000

Setenave Setubal

1974 opening

i 974

opening

Senegal

New yard

Three docks from 300-500,000

Singapore

Hitachi-Robin

1,190

215

NA

400,000

1975 opening

Jurong

1,160

185

NA

300,000

In operation

NA

NA

NA

400,000

Possible 1975

1,260

210

30

477,000

1974 opening

Mitsubishi-Singapore
Sembawang

NA

S. Africa

New yard Saldanha Bay

1,340

265

NA

400,000

Possible 1976 completion

Spain

Astilleros Esparioles Cadiz

NA

NA

NA

400,000

1974 completion

United States

Todd Shipyards Galveston

1,416

216

33

380,000

NA

NA -- Not Available

SOURCE:

Surveyor (rie'" York: American Bur eau of
Shipbuilding, ~ovember 1973), p. 15.
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DWT tankers is contemplated at Baltimore.

~~rylDnd.

None are available on

the Gulf Coast. thour,h a repair dock. designed to handle VLCC's up to a
maximum of 380.000 DWT is planned at Galveston. Texas.
most tankers up to 150.000

D~IT

On the West Coast

and some as large as 230,000 DtIT can now be

drydocked at San Francisco, California.

1

Advances in shipbuilding technology are only as valuable as comparable
gains in repair yard and drydocking facilities.

illlile the revenue for an

active VLCC/ULCC can be considerable, so can its losses Hhen it is tied up
waiting for maintenance or repairs.

OHners and operators want to be sure

that suitable drydocking and repair facilities Hill be available, when
required, for the supertankers they may contemplate ordering.
The U. S. shipbuilding industry has developed the capabilities to
build VLCC' sand ULCC' s ,

IJo\.,1 the ship repair industry must make its own

contribution to the development and operation of the new supertankers.
\-lith the increasing size of tankers and the prospect of U. S. offshore
terminals, i t would be illogical if the ship repair facilities of the
United States, recognizing the economic implications, did not keep abreast
of these trends.

1

Edwf.n N. Hood, Statement before Committee on Herchant Har Lne and
Fisheries, House of Representatives, 11 July 1973.
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Eftective U. S. Control (EUSC) Ships
No discussion of the U, S. merchant marine ..zou Ld he complete wLt hou t
mention of the "effective U. S. con t r o l," (EUSC) ships.
A major and unresolved controversy centers about whether it would be
possible to use, at least for oil imports, the group of ships often referred to as effective U. S. control vessels -- ships registered under
foreign flags by U. S. owners who have agreed to make the vessels available during times of emergency.

The EUSC fleet exists because, in return

for a modest registration fee, the vessel owner is virtually free from
U. S. taxation on ship's earnings and from government
cerning operations, inspections, and crew-manning.

re~ulations

con-

EUSC shipping is also

often referred to as "flags of conv en Lenc e'", but U. S. owner s of ships
under foreign registries prefer the term "flags of necessity."
Many traditional maritime nations -- the United States a notable
exception -- have domestic Laws that forbid their nationals to own and
operate ships under foreign registry.

Under U. S. tax Laxrs , ship owner-s

do not have to pay taxes on earnings from foreign shipping subsidiaries
unless or until paid as dividends.

This is an exception to the normal

treatment of a sales or service subsidiary and a major reason \-Jhy large
oil companies have found EUSC arrangements attractive.
The number of U. S. owned tankers under Liberian or Panamanian flags
is already significant, but the post \-Jar trend of the U. S. oil and

rn~tals

industries to identify thenselves as multi-nationals or international

46
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companies has created a further development \Jhcrein U. S. owned vessels
are registered under the fl<lf,H of other traditionally maritime nations
and operate -- technically. at least. -- in the service of foreign subsidiarics of American corporations.

1

The EUSC tanker fleet currently consists of 18 million DWT. and. withl
some 20 million DIIT under construction or on order. it is generally recognized that these U. S. owned foreign flag ships have to be considered as
a substantial mohilization planninr, factor.

2

The EUSC Itdoctrine of effective control lt is based upon contracts and
agreements between the U. S. gove.rnmen t and owner s of flag-of-convenience
vessels.

The Itlegal" basis for such contracts or agreements is derived

solely from domestic law of the United States; specifically. Section 902
of the Herchant :tarine Act of 1936. vhich gives the government authority
to requisition or purchase for government service any vessels owned by
citizens of the United States.
event of a national

em~rgency

Requisitioning is permitted only in the
proclaimed by the President.

Unanswered, and untested. however. is the question ",hether the Unite
States does, in fact. have the "right" to requisition and take control of
vessels owned by U. S. citizens but registered under foreign flags.

lSubsidies -- Sea Power.
2

Report of the Commission on American Shipbuilding
(Washington. D. C.: Government Printing Office, Octoher 1973).

.- _._-

There are also other factors to consider.

The effective H. S. con-

trolled fleet has been dedicated by the maj o r oil companies mostly to
supplying Europe and Japan.

This in part is due to the size of the vcsselz

\/hich are too large to call at U. S. ports.

This established trade pattern

whf ch commits that fleet may not be disrupted easily without serious eco-

nomic and political repercussions should the U. S. attempt to requisition
the fleet in a transportation crisis.

Further, any

witl~rRwa1

of tankers

from Europe could have an adverse impact on the petroleum supplies vh Lch
would support military and civilian needs of the European countries of the
;1ATO Alliance.

1

The extent of this dedication can be most readily understood by considering that the Euse fleet carried only 20 percent of U. S. oil imports
in 1971.

In addition to the U. S. oil imports carried by the EUSe fleet,
f

U. S. flag tonnage accounted for another 4 percent.

Therefore, more than

I

three-quarters of U. S. oil imports were carried by foreign ships exclusive I
of the EUSC fleet.

I

2

The security implications of reliance on EUSC and other foreign flag
ships are a particular concern to the U. S. Navy.

Admiral E. R. ZumwaI t

Jr., Chief of Naval Operations, phrased the problem this way ;

lRobert J. B'l.ac kweLl , "Statement on EUSe Vessels," The Oceans
and National Economic Development (Hashington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, December 197J), p. 254.
2Report of the Commission on Alnericnn Shipbuilding (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, October, 1973).

,
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• • • is ominous • • • Plnnninr, for the protection
of tankers _'t s c.; !.:~ th,-, event a threat d eve Lops
wou l d he g r ea t Ly enhanced by hav i ng Lar ge numbers
of ships under the lJ. S. flag in time of pence.
The Navy has a ~rf'ater requirement for merchant
ships than is eeneral1y recognized. For example,
merchant sh Ip s a r e ab so l.u t c Iy required to provide
the bulk of the DOD sealift and to augment our
amphibious forces.
1
To further emphas Lze the concern of Admiral Zumwa l t

,

it is evident

that \,fith risine Defense costs and constrained budgets, the U. S. combat
Navy has been forced to drastically reduce its number of active ships -thus, with the compelling need to concentrate on improving its diminished
combat fleet, the Navy is nOH turning

mo r e

to the U. S. merchant marine

for an increasing proportion of its logistic support. 2

To improve the

ability to perform these military support roles, U. S. f J a g ships are built
with national defense features which increase their utility for military
cmplo)~ent

and their self-defense capability.

This includes such features

as extra speed, self-unloading capabilities, and strengthened decks.
In concluding, the following points should be considered when evaluating the use of U. S. flag vessels versus EUSC and other foreign flag
3
}.
sups:

lSee Subsidies -- Sea Power.
2p..ADM George H. Hiller, USN (Ret.), Remarks before The Propeller
Club of Charleston, South Carolina, 21 November 1973.
3Subsidies -- Sea Power.

'I
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Indispntnble control of foreign-registered anel
foreign-manned ships cannot be Bssured.
The changing profile of the EUSC fleet t .rLt h
emphasis on very Lar ge and s pec Ln l.Lz ed 011 and
bulk cnrriers, does not include a sufficient
inventor.y of "clean" tankers to carry the exotic
aviation, vehicle, and ship fuels used by U. S.
military forces.

Lack of national defense features in foreignbuilt ships denigrates the military potential
of the EUSC fleet.
Foreign cr ews might be umTilling to man EUSC
ships during wartime operations.
In the event of war in whi ch the flag of registry
is not a participant, the alien n<lture of the ship
and crew precludes immediate deployment to I;upport
military oper.ations even if strategically located.
Such deplo)'l:lent is possible only when the ship becomes a belligerent, i.e., comes under U. S. or
allied registry.
The disruption of EUSC fleet foreign trade
patterns might cause serious economic and
political repercussions for allied and nonaligned nations.
One fact is clear:
untested concept.

the doctrine of "effective U. S. control" is an

The changing military, political and economic orientation

of tooay's world requires, at the very least, a reevaluation of the EUSC
concept.

Ii
_._---

-----~--~----~-

The Economic Ir,lpact
The f o r ego Lng examples of the marine transportation system and rE'.lated industries, while cursory and incomplete, are sUBeestive of a
number of points:
That while the United States has been up to now
a leader in the development of marine commercial
technolo~y, the net effect has heen primarily ~ne
of export of this technolo~y to other nations.
Tha t a failure to ImpLemerrt this technology under
the U. S. flag. and an exploitation of this technology by other nations, has \-larked to the cor.J.mercial detriment of the United States merchant
marine.
That a suhstantial total economy can be developed
yhich is purely marine-oriented.
That the solution of a numhe r of coastal zone related problems may be inherent In such development.
Certainly many nations have moved extensively to the sea and the
coastal zone for bene f Lt of the economy ,
relationship.
I

Fi~ure

(10) b ea r s out this

Belgium/Luxembourg, utilizing the deepwater harbor of

Antwerp Imve nearly 50 percent of their gross national product involved
in export whLLe the

~:etherlands,

\odtll its "Europort" at Rotterdam, has

nearly 40 percent of its gross national product so involved.

As "ga t eway "

countries, this proportion is quite understandable.

1

U. S. marine technology ,,,~dch has been exploited ahroad
includes the containership concept, barze-carrying ships, gas
turbines, steam turbines and boilers, automation, modular construction and merchant ship nuclear propulsion. (See Congressional
Record (February 1, 1973), pp. E588-539.)
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Deep Hater Port Developments, vo I , I. p. 4-2, (December 1971).

Resour~es.
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Hore surprising is Japan.

It is weLl, known

t

ha t Japan imports nearly

all of her raw materials and that her export/import balance is favorable.
~everthe1ess,

product.

her exports constitute only 10 percent of ller gross national

In addition, as shown in f Lgur e (11), her gross national product

has for the past decade been linearly related to her exports.

This cor-

II
I

relation by itself woul.d not he significant except that its causality se ems:
I

justified since it has been the conscious effort and expectati.on of

'I

Japanes~

economists and Japanese government and industry that this \lould result froJ
the economics of oc eanLc scale in their basic industries.

1

!

They recognize

that efficiency in har dwar e production has its benefit in the release of
manpowe r and resources for sof twar e productivity.

The total is reflected

in the make-up of the gross na t Lona L product and in its growth rate.

I

I
!

I

dicti::t:::te:::::a::n:nt:f:::::n:C::r:::_::::~C::::5::;5::e:::5:nn::::n01 I
I

product, one cannot refrain from comrnent Lng on some obvious characteristics,1
of which table (2) is demonstrative.

The disproportionate percentage in

utilities and commercial activity and government is such that the European
market \-lith only one half the total gross na.tional product of the United
States has two thirds as much manufacturing, a nearly equal volume of
construction, and a slightly larger volume (dollar value) in agriculture.
Recognizing the distortions that price and efficiency play in equating
these factors it must be concluded that here is a substantial difference
in the hardware versus software and services mix of the two societies.

l U• S., Department of the Army, Corps of Engineers, Institute
for Hater Resources, Foreign Deep Hater Port Devclopment~, vo l., 3,
(Springfield, Virginia: National Technical Information Service,
December 1971).
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TABLE 2
NATIONAL GROSS DOHESTIC PRODUCT STRUCTURE -- 1969
France

Belgium

Netherlands

Germany

Italy

U. K.

U. S. A.

Percent
Hanufacturing

34.7%

30.4%

30.7%

39.n

27.3%

34.6%

28.1%

Agriculture
Construction
Mining
Utilities
Conunercia1

6.6
10.2
.9
1.9
36.8

5.5
6.6
1.7
2.2
46.4

7.4
7.9
1.6
2.1
41.8

4.3
6.8
1.8
2.0
36.4

11.0
8.0
.7
2.6
38.5

3.1
6.8
1.8
3.6
43.0

2.9
4.5
1.6
2.3
46.5

8.9

7.2

8.5

9.5

11. 9

7.1

14.1

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Government

I
I
I
I

Gross Domestic Product

I

1

Billions of Dollars
$ 32.8

$265.0

7.0
11.1

$ 19.9
8.0
5.8

2.9
6.5

27.4
42.4

.4
.5

2.9
3.3

.5
1.9

1.7
3.4

15.1
21.7

9.4

9.5

59.2

28.0

40.8

438.5

11.4

1.5

1.9

15.3

8.7

6.7

133.0

129.5

20.1

22.8

162.5

72 .8

94.8

9!13.0

7.0

$ 63.7

13.2

1.1
1.3

1.7
1.8

Nining
Utilit ies

1.2
2.5

.3
.4

Commercial

47.7

Government

Hanufacturing
Agriculture
ConRtruction

Gross Domestic Product
SOURCE;

$ 44.9
8.6

$

6.1

$

Arthur D. Little, Inc , , Orr,anization for Economic Cooperation and Devel opmcnt ,
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Rccogn Lz Lng further that the consumption of

eneq~y

and mat er Lal.s

cannot be met \.,rithout exogenous import wlrLch must in turn he paid for
by export of goods and services, then it is suggestive that our ability
to meet and expand our needs is a function not only of our nntional
ability to produce foods for export, but is also a function of the
relative efficiency and price at which these goods are produced.

This

relative efficiency may in turn be related to the economies achieved
through the scale of marine industry.
The construction and expansion of the deepwater ports, primarily
for oil handling and storage and unitized cargo, at Rotterdam, AntHerp,
Amsterdam, LeHavre and Dunkirk attest to the idea that this conclusion
has been reached by the European conmun Lty , 1

It is certainly the con-

c1usion of the Japanese.

I}Iarine Engineerin£{Loa (New York:
Corporation, June 1973), pp. 153-226.

Simmons Boardman Publishing

Ii
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Summary

Even though this paper has employed a broad perspective, there
appears to be enough evidence to sugbest that \1e examine as a nation
the effect of sea-based commerce and industry on the total economy
and the substance of the total economy.

1

Certainly it has been the

clear policy of the Admini.stration to support and encourage such growth.
Yet this policy has been relatively frustrated by factors whLch have not
yet been brought into proper perspective.

Although all tIle causes for

the failure of our marine transportation system to flourish on a world
scale are not yet fully understood, several factors can be cited as
contributory:
lIarine transportation systems do not operate
in a free and conp et Lt Lvc situation in tile
world mark~t. P.estrictive carriage and cargo
preference, as well as other national policies
Hhich have historically been exercised by the
more successful maritime nations, preclude
U. S. flag competition for wor Ld cargo. ~1ore
and more countries, by some form of preference
system, ~re reserving cargo for their merchant
marines.
Among the leading nations of today,

1

The Second Annual Report (June 1973) of the National Advisory
Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere states (p. 5):
liThe decline of the t;. S. merchant marine and our groHing
dependence on foreign bottoms for shippinS, long deplored
from the vi~~oint of national security, deserves also to
be looked at from the point of view of the impact on our
place in the wo r Ld ec onomy ;"
2Report of the Commission on American Shipbui1dini:; (lJashington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, October 1973).
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Russia carries at least 50 percent of her
foreign trade in her own flap,ship~; Japan
carries 46.6 percent; France, 38.3 percent;
Great Britian, 35 percent; Italy, 23.1 perrn~t;
Sweden, 22.3 percent; and the United States,
without preference support, carries, by comparison, 5.6 percent of its foreign trade. l
Competing attitudes by various Pederal agencies
concerning our domestic needs and foreign interests have tended to promote foreign marine
transport systems at the expense of our mID.
The Cargo Preference Act of 1954 generally requires that at least 50 percent of governmentgenerated cargos be shipped on U. S. flag
vessels. Unfortunately, while the ~~ritiMe
Administration is attempting to promote U. S.
flag carriage, other agencies (such as Department of Agriculture, Agency for International
Development, Inter-American Development Bank,
etc.) have administratively interpreted the 50
percent ~riteria as a maximum rather than a
minimum.
Horeover, cargo preference has not
been effectively employed as a "policy" tool
to stimulate domestic shipping.
Foreign affiliates of U. S. corporations use
their foreign registered fleets to support
their oceanborne transportation needs. Therefore, a significant amount of wor Ld cargo,
particularly energy fuels, is effectively
removed _from the competitive marketplace.
The vested interests of the multi-national
corporations serve to inhibit the participation, and indeed the size, of the U. S.
flag fleet in U. S. oceanborne commerce.
Restrictive, and conflicting, regulatory
statutes of Federal regulatory agencies
(Federal MaritiQc Commission and Interstate Commerce Conmission) have inhibited
the optimized movement of unitized cargos.

lRAD~1 George H. Miller, USN (Ret.), Remarks before The Propeller
Club of Charleston, South Carolina, 21 November 1973.
2s e e U. S., Congress, House, Report of the Activities of the Herchant
Harine and Fisheries Commi.ttee, 92d Corigr e s s O-lashington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 33-34; Sea Power (Hashington, D. c. :
llavy League of the U. S., September 1973), pp. 16-17.

.--
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The benefits of industry-wide cooperation in
standardization, research, and the exchanp.e
of engineering and teclmicnl information are
significant in other countries, particularly
Japan. Similar benefits are largely denied
to U. S. shipbuilders because of the possibility of antitrust action by the Government.
The environmental protective efforts have tended
to create a negative attitude inhibiting our
maritime advancement. These efforts have failed
to recognize that our gr owi.ng dependency upon
foreign flags coupled with our increasing oceanborne traffic do not provide the environmental
control inherent in U. S. carriage. The concern
expressed h;;!re relates to ship safety and environmentally designed and constructed transport
systems, including offshore terminals and offshore oil development.
In summary, the revitalization of our marine transportation system
is imperative wIlen measured in terms of the benefits to be derived by
our economic, political and military needs.
It is obvious that there are both competing and complementary
activities at wor k in the overall marine transportation system.

It

is equally obvious that these many activities have not yet been adequately defined or articulated, either quantitatively or qualitatively.
Also, it must be recognized that the U. S. as a mature technological
society, enjoying the highest standard of living in the world, has an
initial competitive disadvantage, vis-a-vis other nations.

As is the

case with many other sectors of the economy, the marine transportation
sector has a higher operating cost than similar systems of otller nations.
But this disadvantage can be substantially reduced, if not altogether
removed, with increased maritime productivity -- and the U. S. maritime
industry possesses the requisite entrepreneuial and technological acumen.

60
However, this brings us full circle, for to increase productivity to agree
with operating costs and market requirements and competition requires an
assured and well established market.

If this market is to be realized,

it must be, ss in other countries, the result of a sustained and positive
national policy.

Central to this policy is the resolution of the concerns

which have been cited throughout this paper.

~
I
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NLW Sri:!' TYPE

j)ESIGtlATIm~S

I

New ship type designations now in common use include:
ULCC and VLCC

OBO

Ultra Large Crude Carriers (400,000 mIT and larger)
and Very Large Crude Carriers (200,000 to 400,000
mlT) • These liquid bu Lk supertankers provide very
economic transportation. Special areas of concern
include the need for expensive port facilities, environmental precautions and efficient management ofl
the vehicle and its Lnt er Loc kcd distribution and
processing system.
Ore/Bulk/Ore, a versatile carrier of moderate size
(about 100,000 g r os s tons), that can be rapidly
converted to any liquid or dry bulk cargo. Their
operations and routes are highly flexible and require efficient schedulinp, and management.

I

I
,

CUNTAIHER

These ships carry large interlocked boxes (containe~s)
of pre-packaged cargo. Container ships are the
modern, fast packets, demanding rigid scheduling an~
high utilization. Port facilities are complex and II
expensive. Loads vary from 300 to 1,000 containers Ii
per ship with speeds typically 25 knots and on up t~
the middle 30' s ,
"

LNG

Liquified Natural Gas. These ships are the newest
type, designed to transport natural gas in a super-I
cooled liquid form. Costs of these ships may approach 100 million dollars. They have all the
I
aspects of liquid petroleum carriers (pollution
potential, scheduling, port facilities) plus ITlany
specialized needs of their own ,

il

I

I
I

LASH (or SEABEE)

Lighter Aboard Ship Systems. (LASH is Prudential
Lines' design; SEABEE is Lykes' entry.) Lighters
(barges) are carried aboard these ships, being
loaded and unloaded by onboard elevators. Tugboats
handle the lJarges and deliver them to the destination user. Like containers, they are pre-packed.
Ships have very high productive utilization (short
in port or cargo handlin8 periods) and do not require specialized port facilities. The USH system
employs barges of about 400 gross ton capacity
II
viier eas t he SEABEE system uses barges of about; 750
ton capacity (one half the size of standard river
barges) •

I
I
I
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RO/RO

Roll-on/Roll-off. Truck trailers are driven on and
off ship. In this specialized form of container
R~~"fce. the cnr-go is pre-pncked and can be directl".
delivered or picked up hy truck or hy train/truck
combination5. Scheduling is important and 50me
specialized port facilities are needed.

I

'I
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